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A plea for a history of educational knowledge
ABSTRACT. The following contribution expands the current discussion on the
status and function of the history of education at the methodological, or episte-
mological, level by introducing the perspective of a history of educational knowl-
edge. This opens up a theoretical option for educational historiography that avoids
the identiﬁcation of history of education with history of a discipline, or the insti-
tutionalized knowledge of education and teaching. As a consequence, some history
of education topoi – as the history of a discipline – can be called into question and
practiced historically rather than educationally or morally.
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Since 1996, a remarkable debate has been going on in the journal
Paedagogica Historica1 over the relation of educational historiogra-
phy to so-called postmodernism and the educational function of a
history of education. Using the pair of concepts ‘‘history of science’’
and ‘‘history of knowledge,’’ I will address on a methodological,
or epistemological, level the problems that are left open in the
discussion on the educational function of the history of education
in postmodern society. However, I ﬁnd the trendy concept of
1 See especially Paedagogica Historica XXXII (2) 1996, Paedagogica Historica
XXXV (2) 1999, Paedagogica Historica XXXV (2) 1996, and Paedagogica Historica
XXXVII (3) 2002. I will also refer to some contributions to the topic that appeared in
History of Education 2, 2003 and History of Education. 28/1, 1999.
Studies in Philosophy and Education 23: 393–408, 2004.
 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
postmodernism2 too vague a basis and the idea of context, as post-
modernism terms it, inadequate. Instead, I will examine some
considerations – Skinner’s concept of the history of ideas and Fou-
cault’s history of knowledge – that have occupied historians and,
in part, philosophers for the last thirty years and that may be
signiﬁcant for the historiography of education. On this basis, I believe
that I can show the extent to which, ﬁrst, the history of education
should not be viewed as identical with the history of a discipline, or
the institutionalized knowledge of education and teaching; second,
that some of its topoi (such as established periodizations,3 national
canons,4 classical works and ‘‘great men’’5 and the distinction be-
tween formal and non-formal education) should be called into
question; and, third, that the history of education should be formu-
lated and practiced historically, and not educationally or morally.
THE RENAISSANCE OF THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION
AND ITS EDUCATIONAL FUNCTION6
Historians of education agree that the history of education has en-
joyed a Renaissance since the 1960s. There is less agreement, how-
2 The juxtapositioning of modernism, as the period of the great meta-narrative,
and postmodernism, as the period of the fragmentary and the narrative, is based on
an exorbitant historical fallacy. From the postmodern perspective, however, there is
a huge meta-narrative on the modern period that historical research would do well to
dispense with. To note just one problem with this juxtaposition, I would like to
mention the relation of the fragmentary to processes of longue dure´e. Should in fact
postmodern historiography refer only to the fragmentary, it would no longer be in a
position to explain the durability of semantics and historical processes. For so-called
postmodernist theorists, some speciﬁc contemporary forms of social experience (like
ﬂexibility, discontinuity in way of life, fragmentation of biographies) are transformed
directly into epistemological criteria of historiography. It appears, however, that the
debate over modern and postmodern has lost some of its fashionable explosive
power, and the tone of the discussion has become milder. We are therefore in an
excellent situation to lead a scientiﬁc discussion on educational historiography since
the crisis of humanistic historiography.
3 See here J. Oelkers’ study (1996) on the historiography of progressive education
as a history of dogmas.
4 Compare Daniel Tro¨hler’s contribution to the present issue and R. Horlacher
(2003).
5 See here Andresen (2003).
6 I thank Daniel Tro¨hler for his suggestions and for providing bibliographical
references.
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ever, over the reasons for this new interest in historiography. And
when it comes to its scientiﬁc status and consequent function, there is
controversy.
While it is not diﬃcult to note the success of educational historio-
graphy in the face of the numerous debates in various educational
journals on its status and its function, the founding of some new
journals focusing on the ‘‘History of Education’’ and, particularly, the
high volume of history of education studies being published,7 some
hermeneutic eﬀorts are required as to the contextualization of this
renewed interest in historically-oriented educational research. Some
educational theorists, like Ju¨rgen Herbst, see a connection between the
success of educational historiography in the 1960s and 1970s and
societal changes at the time, mainly the emergence of new political
subjects. The women’s and labor movements on the one hand, and
continually increasing migration and mobility of the population at the
international level on the other hand, seem to have contributed to-
wards the rediscovery of the history of education and expanded it to
encompass new topics. The history of women, the family, cultural and
ethnic minorities, and social movements represent new ﬁelds of
investigation in historical research (Herbst, 1999, p. 739). At ﬁrst
glance, Herbst appears to want to conduct the history of education in
the sense of cultural studies, in that he places central importance on the
political categories of race, gender, and class. In fact, however, this is a
sociological extension of the history of education that has not fully
considered the methodological and theoretical consequences of a
cultural studies shift in the historiography of education.
Other educational theorists focus their educational historio-
graphical considerations on the relation between the new social hi-
story of education of the 1960s, the new cultural history of education
of the 1980s, social transformations, and epistemological changes in
traditional historiography (see, for example, Cohen and Depaepe,
1996; Escolano, 1996; Lowe, 1996; Rousmaniere, 1996).
These two attitudes towards educational historiography and its
success are revealed in the theorists’ assessments of the consequences
of that success and in the directions that they set. While some work
towards a new history of education, others are committed towards a
social history of the science of education, where the main interest is
the linking of theory and practice.
7 For an overview of the new map of educational historiography, see Tenorth
(2003) and Depaepe (2001).
EDUCATIONAL THEORISTS AND THEIR HISTORY OF EDUCATION 395
In a 1996 special issue of Paedagogica Historica (1996/32), which
was devoted to the topic of the history of education’s responses to
postmodernism, Heinz–Elmar Tenorth already raises a critical voice.
He criticizes the consequences of the theorizing in the history of
education in the last thirty years of the twentieth century and takes a
clear position in support of the professionalization of educational
historical research (Tenorth, 1996). Tenorth writes that the renuncia-
tion of educational self-interpretations and the methodizing and
theorizing of educational historiography of the last 30 years have
resulted not only in abandonment of the old topoi of the discipline,
but also of the historically handed-down unity of reﬂection and
practice, theory and action, and historical and contemporary con-
sciousness of the educational task (ibid, p. 346). The history of ideas
and discourse-analytical analysis, says Tenorth, have led historical
research in the ﬁeld of education to lose its orientating function, in
that the former ‘‘history-izes’’ utopias and norms and thus relativizes
them, and the latter, especially in Foucault’s version, questions the
value of modern institutions.
Three years after Tenorth’s ambivalent assessment of the success
of historical research, Jurgen Herbst called for a reinvigoration of the
lost sense of educational orientation (Herbst, 1999). In an article on
the ‘‘State of the art of the history of education,’’ Herbst sees a
potential for a new educational function of historiographical research
by making it an essential component of teacher education and
training.8 With this, Herbst steers the whole debate over the type and
status of educational historiography to the question of the audience,
or the imagined audience. In other words, the assumed need for
orientation on the part of teachers – understood here as educational
practitioners, not educational theorists – now becomes the criterion
of a practice-relevant history of education.9
One of the consequences of concentrating the historiographical
debate on the possible audience of the history of education is the
rehabilitation of a genre that discourse-analytical historical research
8 Other aspects of Herbst’s argumentation are not discussed here. Herbst sees
professionalization of the history of education as an alternative to the historical
revisionism of the 1980s and 1990s, which he holds responsible for the decline of
interest in educational historiography of the 1960s and 1970s.
9 In response to Herbst’s call, a number of critical interventions followed, in which
another criterion of the professionalization of educational historiography – namely,
professional knowledge transfer – was proposed (see, among others, Marc Depaepe,
2001).
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had criticized strongly: the history of the classic ﬁgures and texts of
education. Virtually untouched by the deconstruction of social sci-
entiﬁc historiography, these ‘‘great men’’ of educational history and
their works have become topical once again. The only eﬀect of the
debates on authors and texts, on inter-contextuality and inter-disci-
plinarity, on national stereotyping in historiography, and on the
dominance of patriarchical models appears to be that the roster of
great names has been expanded to include some generally recognized
ﬁgures from other disciplines and other countries, as well as a few
women. The justiﬁcation for this revival of the most typical form of
historiography in the social sciences is probably the special impor-
tance of the audience for educational historiography (compare Te-
north, 2003, p. 10). The great ﬁgures serve as educational role models
who reconcile theory and practice in the desired way. They serve
teachers as a reservoir of theoretical and practical aids, if not deﬁn-
itive solutions, writes Tenorth (ibid., p. 12): the great ﬁgures in
education symbolize and represent educational tasks that must al-
ways be fulﬁlled anew and problems in educational theory in which
the construction of the task and the hypothesized solutions must
always be researched anew. Therefore, they document the stocks of
problems and tasks upon which educational theory research and
educational practice live (Tenorth, 2003, p. 12).
If we took the logic of this argumentation to the bitter end, we
would have to ask ourselves who comes ﬁrst when it comes to the
determining function, teachers or the history of education? If the
history of education is supposed to have an orientating function, then
the problem can be solved only through scientiﬁc clariﬁcation of what
should be regarded as adequate teacher education. However, the fact
that the contemporary body of teachers, teachers whose education
and training still stands within a humanities tradition, cannot be the
starting point for a new deﬁnition of educational historiography is
rather obvious, in my opinion, unless one has a liking for vicious
circles.
The way out of the circulus vitiosus of the current discussion on the
relation of teachers to the history of education requires, I believe, a
further step – one which calls into question the identiﬁcation of the
history of education with the history of educational science as a
discipline that is implied in the debate sketched out above.
Attempts to problematize the historiography of education must
not refer exclusively to the topics, people, and aspects of the disci-
pline. The result of that posture is in no way positive for consolida-
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tion of the discipline as compared to other scientiﬁc ﬁelds. In fact,
subsuming theoretical considerations under moral or practical tasks
results in a loss of scientiﬁc credibility. Educational scientists should
ask themselves with a portion of irony what legal historian or what
philosopher, to name two scientiﬁcally established disciplines, would
think that the history of law should be written for lawyers alone, or
the history of philosophy for philosophy teachers only? Even worse,
what legal historian or philosopher would think that someone other
than a jurist, or philosopher, should write the scientiﬁc history of law
or philosophy?10
I believe that one of the problems of the self-deﬁnition of the
discipline of educational science lies in the understanding of its
relation to theory and practice and in the relation of theory and
practice.
In the following section, I turn to a clariﬁcation of the relation of
theory and practice before making an attempt at an initial deﬁnition
of the history of educational knowledge.
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY AND THE THEORY OF
PRACTICE
Focusing on the teacher or educator as the addressee of educational
considerations and historical research presupposes a clear separation
between theory and practice. According to this view, educational
scientists ﬁnd educational legitimization only if they refer to the
practice of their audience, and teachers and educators ground their
practice in science only when they are guided by theory and by his-
torical role models.
Some theoretical considerations that have been developed in the
very area of historiography have pointed out the artiﬁciality of this
separation of theory and practice and emphasized the performative
character of theory, or the material productivity of knowledge. I will
refer to only two treatments of this problem, which I ﬁnd represen-
tative of the broader ﬁeld of discussion in historical semantics:11
10 To take Germany as an example, the unfortunate consequences of such an
attitude is revealed by the fact that, for instance, there exists no Max–Planck
Institute of the history of education.
11 For an overview of the diﬀerent forms of historical semantics (history of terms,
history of discourse, and history of metaphors), see Bo¨deker, 2002.
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Quentin Skinner on the performative function of language and
Michel Foucault on ‘‘discursive practice’’.
With no intention of overlooking diﬀerences between Skinner’s
version of the history of ideas and Foucault’s discourse analysis, my
interest here is to point out the signiﬁcance for the historiography of
education of their reﬂections on the pragmatic emergence of theories
and the linguistic codiﬁcations of practitioners.
Skinner’s notion of performative language refers to the practical
eﬀect of statements.12 The background of this view of language is a
bow to its realistic task. Language does not have to reﬂect reality;
instead, it produces reality with its utterances. This performative
feature of language should not be confused with the poietic power of
the idea as conceived by the idealists. It is not about deriving reality
from a theory, from reason, or from an idea. It is about the rhetorical
power of language. We say things, not in order to explain the facts of
a phenomenon, but in order to push through a particular interpre-
tation of that phenomenon. In this sense, we are always doing
something as well as saying something. We say things in order to
make possible a particular eﬀect. The relation between utterances and
their eﬀects is not, however, causal in nature. But this in no way
excludes the intentional character of speech acts.
Following Austin’s (1962) and Searle’s (1969) investigations of the
uses as opposed to the meanings of words, Skinner develops a theory
of historical interpretation that sees itself as contextualization of the
eﬀects of speech acts. Authors of classic texts are no longer inter-
preted on the basis of their contributions to the perennial issues and
problems within a discipline. Instead, the eﬀect of their writings is
viewed as to the context in which they emerged and measured
according to their semantic change. In both cases, intellectual context
and semantic changes, the meaning and eﬀect of the speech act are
explained by looking at the things that speech acts can do in and by
the use13 of language and their rational paradigm. Use and rational
paradigm of a speech act delimit the sphere of what, at any particular
time, is held to be true. To this belong forms of belief, customs, and
12 My analysis of Skinner’s performative character of language bases on a volume
by Skinner on historical interpretation that was published in Italian (Skinner, 2001).
13 Use is used by Skinner following Wittgenstein’s considerations in his later
writings, particularly Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1958, paragr.
11, p. 546).
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conventions that in a particular context allow speech acts to appear
credible.
Here, the impossibility of distinguishing between theory and
practice shows up in two ways. First, theories and interpretations
have eﬀects in that they reproduce, institutionalize, canonize or
change certain traditions, manners, and customs. Second, theories are
always dependent upon the social and political context.
Following Skinner’s considerations, educational theory and edu-
cational practice can no longer be strictly separated. It seems to make
even less sense to diﬀerentiate between the history of ideas of edu-
cation and its social history (compare Oelkers, 2001).
Whereas Skinner’s historical interpretation of the performative
character of language refers to the intentions or ideas of the author,
Foucault’s analysis of the language of practices, institutions, and
scientiﬁc codiﬁcations applies to utterances whose performative
character does not rest upon the author’s intentions, but on the
epistemological role that they play in a deﬁned historical and scien-
tiﬁc context. It is not the author who determines the intention of his
writings. They gain their meanings directly from the locations
(institution, discipline, manners) at which they are uttered. The
subject of Foucault’s analysis is not the history of theories or the
history of ideas, but the way in which scientiﬁc discourse is practiced,
or regimes of practices (Foucault, 1969, p. 81).
Far from being two, separate spheres, theory and practice are two
sides of the same coin. To put it more simply with regard to educa-
tional practice and theory, we could say that every teacher or edu-
cator acts knowingly, and every historian of education researches
actively. Both of these activities, educational research and educa-
tional action are, to follow Foucault’s argument, determined by the
same rules that determine their context. As Foucault explains, he tries
to grasp scientiﬁc discourse not from the point of view of the
speaking individuals and not from the perspective of the formal
structures that determine what they say, but rather from the per-
spective of the rules that are important for the sheer existence of this
discourse (Foucault, 1970, p. 15).
Although Skinner’s history of ideas also allows deconstruction
of social scientiﬁc historiography and its topoi, it still remains
bound to the great ﬁgures of history whose ideas it attempts to
contextualize. In contrast, Foucault’s history of the practices of
knowledge opens up the possibility of a history without great ﬁg-
ures. Foucault rejects the practice of relating a piece of discourse to
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its speciﬁc author. It is not the great authors that should stand at
the center, but rather the locations, contexts, in which individuals
have practiced certain forms of knowledge.14 Foucault writes that
when we attempt to examine discursive networks or epistemological
ﬁelds that encompass a (simultaneous or successive) plurality of
concepts and theories, it becomes evident that attribution to one
individual is impossible. Likewise, the analysis of the transforma-
tions can hardly be attributed to a particular individual. This is
because the transformation generally takes place through the works
of various individuals; it is not a discovery, an assertion, or a
clearly formulated thought that is explicit within a single work.
Instead, transformation can be established if we look for it as
something that occurred in a number of various texts’’ (Foucault,
1969, p. 74).
Whether and how a history of education can be written without
the classic texts and without education’s ‘‘great men’’ and also ‘‘great
women’’ is a question that only a future generation of educational
historians can answer.
Neither Skinner nor Foucault can be said to dispense with the
normativity of action. Rather, we are dealing here with a pragmatic
modiﬁcation of the rational (see Schneider, 2003, p. 225), which may
be eminently suitable for the historiography of a social science like
the history of education.
From the perspective of the relation of theory and practice, it is
clear that deﬁnition of the status and type of educational historio-
graphy is confronted with a number of theoretical problems, partic-
ularly with regard to the object of and the type of historiography of
education. How can these problems be approached? If we are to solve
them within the perspective of the discipline and its traditional con-
solidation using national canons and established role models, then we
will have to deal with the history of the science of educational science,
with the history of its institutions and its topoi. If we attempt to cross
the conﬁnes of the handed-down discourse on education, however,
this will mean turning to the history of educational knowledge and its
locations and institutions. In that case, the issue is not only the
content of the history of education, but the concept of education
itself.
14 On the diﬀerences between Skinner’s and Foucault’s historiography, see Keane
(1995).
EDUCATIONAL THEORISTS AND THEIR HISTORY OF EDUCATION 401
HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE OR HISTORY OF SCIENCE
At the risk of simplicity, a short and pithy deﬁnition of the diﬀerence
between a history of knowledge and a history of science could be the
following: history of knowledge refers to theoretical objects, while
history of science refers to forms and locations in which and at which
scientiﬁc objects are captured. In this view, history of knowledge is
the history of epistemological changes or, to follow Kuhn, shifts in
scientiﬁc paradigms, or, in traditional terms, the history of ideas. The
history of science is the history of academic disciplines (including
their canonized knowledge) and the institutions that control access to
the various scientiﬁc objects.
Faced with these two possible ways of conducting historical re-
search and representing historical material, historians of education
behave rather one-sidedly. Educational theorists make a plea for and
practice in the main a history of science, or more precisely, a history
of their discipline. Even in cases where educational theorists deal de
facto with the history of knowledge in their discipline, they do this
from the perspective of the discipline and not from that of the object
of knowledge. Histories of educational epochs or histories of the
classic authors, however, ultimately serve only to conﬁrm a particular
history of the discipline and its institutionalization.
This stance, however, should not be seen simply as an unreﬂected
but widespread practice, as if to say that educational theorists were
reproducing a particular historiography without being aware of the
type of historical research they were conducting. The fact is that
educational theorists utilize various theoretical approaches con-
sciously to defend the decision to practice the history of education as
the history of a discipline, or as history of science.
The intentional reproduction of a particular historiography on the
part of educational theorists can be shown by taking the example of
the current debate on professionalization of the history of education
that I mentioned above.
In disregard of the results of thirty years of methodological debate
among historians about how history should be written in the wake of
the so-called linguistic turn or the crisis of the humanistic approach
(see Bo¨deker, 2002; Sarasin, 2003, p. 10–60), educational theorists
settle for a Renaissance of the history of education that is determined
educationally insofar as it is directed to a target group. The central
issue for educational historians is: Who should read the history of
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education? This special way of subjectivizing historiography is
defended in the name of professionalizing historical research. The
‘‘who’’ of the history of education is no longer the historian (the
author) or the hero of the discipline, but rather the audience. This
focusing of educational historiography on the target group has be-
come so dominant that some educational theorists have even called
for a strict separation between a history of education that is written
by educational theorists for educators and a history of education that
is written by historians (compare here William Richardson, 1999).15
It is not diﬃcult to imagine the consequences such a division would
have on the discipline. At the level of scientiﬁc comparison and
competition with other disciplines, the history of education would
isolate itself, and as to the education and training of teachers, it
would bring up teachers who would teach and educate pupils using
contents and role models of yesteryear.
Approaching the problem at an epistemological level, however,
and attempting to contextualize education’s preference for history of
science, there are some historical remarks that can be made. They
have to do with national construction, which stands behind the idea
of history of science, and the cultural context in which it emerged.
The prerequisite of history of science is the way that in the nine-
teenth-century Europe of nations, the science of history was instru-
mentalized for the purpose of consolidating national identity.16
History as a resurrection of the past becomes a national resource for
the future, in that it brings a national past to life. Obviously, the
process of scientiﬁcally establishing national identities aﬀects not
only educational science. The various sciences play very diﬀerent
roles in this context, depending upon their scientiﬁc prestige and their
political signiﬁcance.17 This idea of history as a resurrection of the
past is supported by the bourgeoisie, which views political power and
the institutions that have achieved it as the result of a historical
process, of progress, that has reached its highest point and therefore,
even if the power and institutions are not without ambivalence,
should be maintained and protected.
15 Aldrich (2003) has criticized this rigid separation between history of ‘‘histo-
rians’’ and history of ‘‘educationists.’’
16 It is not by accident that Micha Brumlik speaks of identity discourses when
referring to the debate on classic ﬁgures and texts (Brumlik, 2000, p. 41).
17 On the role of the natural sciences in the constitution of national identities, see
Jessen and Vogel (2002).
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Whereas the history of science accents tradition and continuity, the
history of knowledge – both in the sense of Skinner’s history of ideas18
and in the sense of Foucault’s history of knowledge practices –
emphasizes changes, ruptures, semantic and conceptual changes,
epistemic shifts. The educational function of a history of knowledge
would lie in the transmission of experiences of change of historical
processes. The motivation for a transition to a history of knowledge is
not, however, for the sake of educational or moral purposes, but ra-
ther the historical understanding of the history of science, or histories
of science, as a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. For an ade-
quate historical analysis of the history of science would have to take
three aspects into consideration: the relation between the diﬀerent
histories of science (relating to diﬀerent disciplines), the relation be-
tween a discipline and the development of its institutions (school,
academy, university, association), and the cultural traditions that have
inﬂuenced the historiography of a discipline. As an analysis of this
kind demands comparative investigation, it can hardly be conducted
only from within the internal perspective of a discipline.
It is Foucault, who provided the most important contribution
towards understanding the distinction between history of science and
history of knowledge (see Foucault, 1969b). Following Foucault, the
diﬀerence between knowledge and the various forms of knowledge is
categorical in nature. Knowledge takes the form of an episteme and is
anchored within a particular epoch. The episteme, or knowledge,
presents the totality of relationships within which sciences and for-
malized systems obtain their meaning (see Foucault, 1969b, pp. 272–
273). For Foucault, independently of institutionalized diﬀerences
between the various sciences, there is an order of discourse that is
epistemological in nature and represents the transcendental in an
epoch (see Casale, 2001 pp. 41–44). The historical character of the
epistemes in Foucault is radically diﬀerent from the original meaning
of transcendental in Kant. Here, transcendental does not mean deep
structure, but rather the relation between the diﬀerent scientiﬁc
statements: it is merely a description that deliberately refers to the
surface (Foucault, 1973, p. 505).
18 For Skinner, the diﬀerence between his own type of historiography and R.
Koselleck’s Begriﬀsgeschichte (conceptual history, as developed and practiced in
Germany) is that Begriﬀsgeschichte is interested only in processes of longue dure´e. In
contrast, Skinner’s investigations focus upon changes in concepts (Skinner, 2001,
p. 180).
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Despite this superﬁcial determination of the episteme, it is diﬃcult
to understand it without thinking of a totality whose historicity and
systematicity is very problematic (see Daston, 2003, p. 213). Fou-
cault’s concept of knowledge, or the episteme, suggests that an epoch
has its own particular historical character. As Lorraine Daston has
pointed out, the systematicity of epistemes implies the notion of an
uninterrupted rhythm of history itself, the notion of fundamentally
coherent periods, which are disrupted by dramatic turning points,
for due to their nature, epistemes cannot change in a step-wise
fashion (Daston, p. 213). Foucault’s deﬁnition of episteme seems
reminiscent of Hegel’s redivivus, but minus Hegel’s progress and
minus teleology.
In the face of these objections, a revision of Foucault’s concept of
history of knowledge following Daston makes sense. The issue is no
longer to link forms of knowledge to the sequence of uniform his-
torical periods, but rather to seek their dependency upon objects,
contexts, and locations. Daston points out that ‘‘spaces of knowl-
edge’’ bring locations and boundaries into the picture. In these
spaces, there are positions relative to one another, and there are
also regions ‘‘outside’’ that do not belong. The nature of these
spaces seems to be more Aristotelian than Euclidean or Newtonian
(Daston, p. 215). The spaces of knowledge should correspond to the
topics of the objects, the content, and not the sequence of periods in
time.
Similarly, for a history of educational knowledge, I put the accent
on the object, the substance, as that which should be investigated.
Historical research should gain direction and speciﬁcity from edu-
cational phenomena, which must be viewed in their contextuality.
This is an inter-disciplinary perspective, which should not lead to
dissolution of the discipline. The history of education is aware that
educational phenomena cannot be approached without consideration
of theories, analyses, indications, and texts from other disciplines that
have played a role in determining its varying contexts. Examination
of the medical, moral, aesthetic, and literary context of an educa-
tional problem, for example, does not necessarily imply a loss of the
speciﬁcity of the scientiﬁc approach if the direction of the perspective
is guided by the educational object.
Expansion of the educational viewpoint from the perspective of the
history of educational knowledge involves materials, time, and loca-
tions. Expanding and increasing the sources, times, and spaces is
important not only historically. The inclusion of sources, times, and
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areas that have been excluded from the canonized history of education
due to their supposed inconsequential role in the discipline also con-
tributes towards putting in question conventional conceptions of the
discipline. Ultimately, deﬁning the status and function of the discipline
is not concerned with the past and tradition; instead, it means deter-
mining the object, the substance, of the history of education.
No progress towards clarifying the problem will be made so long
as examination of the function and status of the history of education
remains an internal aﬀair of the discipline, its survival, and its direct
reference to teacher education and training.
Only a look from the outside can contribute to an understanding
that the discipline’s way of looking at things deﬁnitely has prob-
lematic, historical, and theoretical implications.
But a structural openness of the history of education to inter-
disciplinary comparison would allow it to develop a more accurate
historical view of the discipline and its manner of proceeding and,
perhaps, to achieve a new conceptual deﬁnition of the discipline.
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